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I. ABSTRACT 
 
Due to the European financial and sovereign debt crisis occurred in 2008, the decision-makers 
of the European Union decided to take steps to avoid a further possible turmoil and created a 
mechanism to ensure the efficiency of financial supervision across the union. This financial 
integration of Europe is called the banking union. The milestones of the union are: the single 
rulebook for the capital requirements of credit institutions (i.), the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) lifting prudential supervision of credit institutions to a European level (ii.), 
a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (iii.) and the common deposit insurance system (iv.). 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism is one of the crucial parts of the banking union, since it 
has the task to extend the European integration to the field of financial supervision. The 
executer of this task shall be the European Central Bank, so in the future the ECB will be 
responsible for both, the monetary policy of the union and the financial supervision of the 
significant European credit institutions. The ECB – with the contribution of the national 
competent authorities – shall supervise the most significant banks of the European Union. The 
SSM will be mandatory for the Euro-zone Member States and voluntary for the rest. 
However, it is unclear whether how many non-euro zone Member State will decide to 
participate. According to the Hungarian situation, it is unlikely that Hungary likely 
participates, because of the uncertainty regarding the untested practice of the SSM.  
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II. PREFACE 
 
The motto of this paper is to provide an insight to the Single Supervisory Mechanism, because 
of 2 (two) reasons. First, the SSM Regulation was adopted on 15
th
 October 2013 and it shall 
be put into force on 4
th
 November 2014. The non-euro zone Member States of the union have 
time to decide on the participation until June 2014. For this reason at this moment, it is 
inevitable to sum up the pros and cons of the participation.  
 
Now, it is opportune to test the advantages and disadvantages of participation to get enough 
information to make a responsible decision.  
 
For the above-mentioned reasons this paper undertakes to analyse the tasks, powers and 
significance of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. As a second step, it comprises the 
possibility of a close cooperation for Member States out of the Euro-zone, in general. 
Furthermore, the paper shall provide a profound assessment specifically in connection with a 
possible close cooperation agreement of Hungary.  
 
The significance of a close cooperation is mainly up to the quality of that cooperation, in 
comparison of the alternate national system. Thus, it would be reasonable to compare the 
significant aspects of the Hungarian national system and the SSM. Nevertheless, this paper 
will not provide that comparison, since the recent Hungarian legislation introduced in 2013 – 
regarding its key points – is mainly identical with the substance of the European legislation; in 
particular, it was designed in conformity with the provisions of CRR
1
 and CRD IV.
2
 For this 
reason, this paper will not provide a point-by-point analysis on the pros and cons of 
participating in the SSM in comparison with staying out and supervise under the recent 
national legislation.  
 
                                                 
1
 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 
2
 Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC 
 6 
Instead, this paper provides a profound analysis on the SSM and on the possibility of a close 
cooperation. In addition, it will be summarized what aspects should be considered in relation 
to accession to the SSM.  
 
 
III. ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AQR ASSET QUALITY REVIEW 
BASEL III. GLOBAL, VOLUNTARY REGULATORY STANDARD ON BANK 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY, STRESS TESTING AND MARKET LIQUIDITY 
RISK. AGREED UPON BY THE MEMBERS OF THE BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION IN 2010–11. 
CRDIV CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS DIRECTIVE 
CRR CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS REGULATION 
EBA EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY 
ECB EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
ECOFIN COUNCIL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL 
EFSF EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY FACILITY 
ESCB EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 
ESM EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM 
ESRB EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD 
EU EUROPEAN UNION 
EURO OFFICIAL CURRENCY OF THE EUROZONE 
EURO GROUP OFFICIAL MEETING OF THE FINANCE MINISTERS OF THE EUROZONE 
JST JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAM 
MNB MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK (NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY) 
NCA NATIONAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY 
SRM SINGLE RESOLUTION MECHANISM 
SSM SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM 
SSM REGULATION COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) NO 1024/2013 
TFEU TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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IV. INTRODUCTION 
 
As the waves of Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crisis are losing strength, the 
significance of the forthcoming European Parliament election in May, 2014 is to decide which 
direction should be chosen for the future of the European integration. The Union is 
undoubtedly at the crossroads regarding the fact that the crises clarified: the existing road 
cannot be continued anymore, renewal is inevitable. There are 2 (two) choices in front of the 
new European Parliament elected 22-25 May,
3
 and moreover the new European Commission, 
elected by the parliament. On one hand, they can endeavour to achieve full integration, at the 
end of the day creating an entity, which can be called as United States of Europe. On the other 
hand, for some Member States, for instance, for the United Kingdom, and recently for 
Hungary United States of Europe is not acceptable, and they want deep integration in some 
issues, but strong sovereignty in others. These Member States are eager to create a European 
Union of potent sovereign nations.  
 
The debate is far not over yet, and both solutions possess effective pros and cons. The 
supreme argument supporting full integration may be that this is the only potential way how 
the EU will be able to make up for the competitive disadvantage it has, compared to its 
biggest competitors, China and the US. Regarding the globally significant issues, like creation 
of a competitive economy in relation to the world market or the fight against global warming 
fragmentation is extremely inefficient, and there is a real need not only for cooperation, but 
for 1 (one) centralized decision making entity. At the same time, representatives of the 
counter-concept say that full integration leads to the inevitable oppression of the most 
powerful members of the union, for the reason that small Member States do not have the same 
ability to enforce their interests.  
 
At this time, it is hard to have a final decision on that matter, but a solution suitable for each 
Member State may be reachable. In my view, the desirable direction is to endeavour to full 
integration and to centralized, fast decision-making process in the most significant global 
                                                 
3
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/us/en/elections_2014.html;jsessionid=B325D8B4821E92930998576CD141F38E 
(date of access: 01.05.2014) 
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issues to maintain and improve the role of the European Union in the global sphere. Besides 
that, it is desired to maintain national competences in all the other issues to avoid the 
distortion of democratic values and to create an efficient level of decision making, because 
except the huge common issues and comprehensive strategies, decision making is more 
effective when it is closer to the entities, it affects.  
 
As regards the future of the banking union, in particular the future of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, it is inevitable that the higher level of the integration is the more supportive 
ambit to the fruition of a universalized financial sector within the European Union. The Single 
Supervisory Mechanism is a crucial step towards the creation of a banking union, which is the 
only tool in the hands of the EU decision-makers right now to prevent the next possible 
financial and sovereign debt crisis. It was immediate to create and have the SSM function 
because of 2 (two) separate motives.  
 
At first, the introduction of the SSM helped to solve the already existed crisis with ex tunc 
effect, in as much Germany was willing to finance the common European assistance to avoid 
bankruptcy for countries like Ireland and Spain, only if they give up parts of their financial 
supervisory independence. In other words, these mainly Mediterranean Member States 
accepted the direct European recapitalization of their banks in a situation, in which they would 
no longer be in a position to do so. In exchange of that, a political pact came into fruition 
regarding the lifting up of the financial supervision from national to a European level.
4
 
 
Secondly, the SSM’s main goal to hinder or at least decrease the possibility of financial 
turmoil in Europe with ex nunc effect. To achieve this goal, the SSM has far more devices 
than the other European bodies have had so far, like the European Banking Authority and the 
European Systemic Risk Board. The EBA is responsible for the micro-prudential supervision, 
but only in a non-binding manner.
5
 The ESRB has macro-prudential responsibilities, but it has 
the same problem as the EBA, namely it also lacks the competence to make binding 
decisions.
6
 The biggest achievement of the SSM is that it includes both, macro- and micro-
                                                 
4
 Verhelst, 2013, p. 9 
5
 ibid, p. 32 
6
 ibid, p. 36 
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prudential supervisory tasks and more importantly powers to be able to decide in a binding 
manner.  
 
The SSM and the whole Banking Union points to a utopia, in which the European financial 
system is a unified entity, as such a coequal partner of the determinative actors of the global 
economy. Coequal partnership means a certain degree of independence as well, for instance in 
relation to credit rating agencies. During the crisis there were several disagreements between 
European decision-makers and the 3 (three) big credit rating agencies. The debate was mainly 
about the different evaluation of the credit worthiness of different Member States by the 
prevalent credit rating agencies, incorporated in the US, and the European institutions. There 
is an explicit need between the decision-makers of the European Union to set up an own 
European rating agency, to reach independence and creditability. However, it is just 1 (one) 
little detail of why it is necessary to establish the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and later the 
banking union. The Single Supervisory Mechanism offers the possibility to supervise, so 
predict and avoid discrepancies in the financial system on a European level. European level of 
supervision could be decisive, regarding the fact that the European financial system is highly 
interconnected between the Member States, sometimes a problem occurs in a supervised 
institution at one Member State, and the effects of that take place within the same institution, 
in another.  
 
 
V. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY 
MECHANISM 
 
V.1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SYSTEM 
 
The system of financial legislation in the EU is quite complex, it consists provisions on the 
European and on national level as well. Both level of legislation consist substantive matters 
and procedural legislation. This cross-linked structure of regulation makes it complex to find 
and implement the recent legislation aiming to reach the banking union in Europe. Regarding 
 10 
the procedural side of the regulation, the SSM Regulation
7
 is prevailing; it regularizes all the 
significant aspects of the procedural rules of the European-wide financial supervision. Its 
power to do so is delegated by Article 127 (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union,
8
 which says the Council has the power to confer specific tasks upon the 
European Central Bank, concerning prudential supervision matters.
9
 For this reason, the 
Regulation establishing the European Banking Authority and conferring specific tasks to it
10
 
has become old-fashioned, thus a modification is just in progress in the form of an ordinary 
legislative procedure, in consistence with the SSM Regulation. At the end of this process, the 
ECB shall carry out its tasks within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which mechanism is 
built on the cooperation of the ECB and the national competent authorities, guaranteed by the 
SSM Regulation,
11
 without prejudice to the legislation established the EBA. However, this 
cooperation does not take place on an equal basis, within the SSM the ECB is the lead 
supervisor, with national supervisors in an assisting role.
12
 
 
As a next step of procedural regulation on EU level, Article 6 (7) of the SSM Regulation
13
 
authorizes the ECB to adopt an ECB Regulation on the framework of the practical 
arrangements of the SSM Regulation.
14
 These 2 (two) regulations, mentioned above embody 
the nucleus of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.  
 
Regarding the Hungarian legal system, there are 2 (two) key acts implementing procedural 
rules in financial supervision. As a general provision in the public administration, the Act on 
                                                 
7
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
8
 Guarracino, 2013, p. 202 
9
The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may 
unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks 
upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings. (Article 127 (6) TFEU) 
10
 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC 
11
 Article 6 (1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 
12
 Verhelst, 2013, p. 9 
13
 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 
14
 Article 6 (7) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013: ”The ECB shall, in consultation with national 
competent authorities, and on the basis of a proposal from the Supervisory Board, adopt and make public a 
framework to organise the practical arrangements for the implementation of this Article.” 
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the general rules of administrative proceedings and services
15
 provides the basic rules of 
supervisory and investigatory procedures of the Hungarian National Bank. With the same 
significance, but with a more specialized scope, there is another act playing important role on 
the procedural side of the legislation: the Act on the Hungarian National Bank.
16
 This act has 
been revised recently, since the parliament just adopted it in 2013, because the unification of 
the national bank and the financial supervisory authority made it requisite to create a 
harmonised legal background with the implication of supervisory goals, tasks and powers into 
the renewed national bank act.  
 
With the Act on the Hungarian National Bank at the end, the list of key-procedural provisions 
is finished. However, if we would like to have a full view on the entire financial legislation, 
we have to take into account the other side of the coin as well: the substantive provisions. 
Considering the substance of financial supervision is quite actual, since the core of EU-level 
provisions came into force in 2013: Council Regulation on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions (CRR)
17
 and Directive on access to the activity of credit institutions and the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions (CRD IV).
18
 
 
Non-negligibly for the above-mentioned reasons, the Hungarian sector act has been annulled 
to avoid fragmentation and structural mistakes within the progress of harmonization. Hence, 
in 2014 the new Act on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises
19
 came into force in 
Hungary changing all the relevant provisions necessary to implement harmonization. The 
most significant issues of harmonization are the following. The new act is supplemented with 
provisions required by EU legislation, in particular with the introduction of chiselled capital 
requirements and buffers to banks and financial institutions and new corporate governance 
rules providing higher standards from prudential aspect.
20
 For the requirement of 
completeness, it has to be mentioned that the Credit Institutions Act also comprises procedural 
provisions, since the 2 (two) other, purely procedural code mentioned above cannot meet with 
                                                 
15
 Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and Services 
16
 Act CXXXIX of 2013 on the Hungarian National Bank 
17
 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 
18
 Directive 2013/36/EU 
19
 Act CXXXVII of 2013 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises 
20
http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/31008 (date of access: 05.05.2014) 
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the requirement of speciality in relation to the particular types of procedures. The act on 
general rules of administrative proceedings comprises all the procedures in public 
administration from financial supervision to fire protection license procedure. As it is like 
that, it can only lay down the basic principles. The National Bank Act provides a more 
specialized level, but it still does not have the possibility to go into the details in particular 
procedures, since it comprises procedures from the authorization process to take up a business 
of a credit institution, to the authorization process of executive officers. For this reason, the 
Credit Institutions Act has the chance to provide the detailed rules of all the procedures related 
to credit institutions and financial enterprises. For a better understanding, the framework of 
financial institutions is provided below: 
 
 
System of financial institutions in Hungary 
 
 
 
 
As I mentioned above, the Credit Institutions Act provides the detailed rules of procedures 
related to credit institutions and financial enterprises. These procedures are including but not 
Financial 
Institution 
Credit 
Institution 
Bank 
Specialized 
Credit 
Institution 
Cooperative 
Credit 
Institution 
Financial 
Enterprise 
 13 
limited to the foundation of a credit institution; the merger (takeover, fusion), demerger of a 
credit institution; the amendment of the articles of association of a credit institution; the 
acquisition of a qualifying interest in a credit institution and for escalating the qualifying 
interest up to the threshold limit; the election or appointment of executive officers of a credit 
institution; the taking up of business of a credit institution; the amendment of the scope of 
activities of a credit institution and the termination of operations of a credit institution.
21
 
According to Hungarian law, all the above mentioned procedures are subordinate to the 
permission of the National Bank of Hungary.  
 
The system of financial legislation in the EU in relation to Hungary 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Section 14 (1) of Act CXXXVII of 2013 
Financial Legislation 
Procedural 
Provisions 
EU 
Legislation 
SSM 
Regulation 
ECB 
Framework 
Regulation 
Hungarian 
Legislation 
Act on the 
General 
Rules of 
Administra
tive 
Proceeding
s and 
Services 
Act CXXXIX 
of 2013 on 
the 
Hungarian 
National 
Bank 
Substantive 
Provisions 
EU 
Legislation 
2013/36 
Directive 
on 
Prudential 
Supervision 
575/2013 
Council 
Regulation on 
Prudential 
Requirements 
Hungarian 
Legislation 
Act CXXXVII 
of 2013 on 
Credit 
Institutions 
and 
Financial 
Enterprises 
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V.2. SCOPE OF THE SSM’S COMPETENCES 
 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism is in order to achieve a goal, not less than the creation of 
a unified supervision of credit institutions that are determinative in relation to the proper 
operation of the European economy. To be able to achieve this ambitious goal, the creators of 
the SSM were able to find the aurea mediocritas in relation to 1 (one) of the most decisive 
features of the system, namely the extent of the regulation. It is not that difficult to admit, that 
a too broad extension would have imposed an incredible workload to the European Central 
Bank and would have caused the possibility of just creating a bigger turmoil in the field of 
financial supervision, instead of unifying, harmonizing and making it more transparent. The 
present regulation has the power to make a difference and reach the goals of its creation, so 
from the opposite perspective, the Council, the European Parliament and the European Central 
Bank has managed to avoid creating and adopting a regulation with significant tasks, but with 
useless, futile powers assigned to it.  
 
Going on a golden mean, the Single Supervisory Mechanism embraces only essential tasks in 
relation to credit institutions determined as significant ones, within the Euro-area. As it can be 
noticed from the statement above, the legislator has confined reasonable limits from 4 (four) 
sides, restricting the scope of the regulation.  
 
Firstly, the rules of the Single Supervisory Mechanism are mandatory only for credit 
institutions under the financial supervision of a Euro-zone Member State. It cannot be 
different, since the SSM confers determinant supervisory powers to the European Central 
Bank, but Members States out of the Euro-zone do not have a single voice in the top 
management of the ECB. For this reason, it is voluntary for Member States outside the Euro-
zone to decide whether they want to join to the SSM in a special liaison, called a close 
cooperation or not. If Member States out of the zone predominantly choose not to join, it 
should not be a real problem in terms of its proper functioning, since the Regulation assigns 
the specific rules for cross border activity of significant credit institutions incorporated in a 
non-Euro Member State, but providing services within the Euro-area.  
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Secondly, the SSM Regulation refers only to credit institutions,
22
 and does not encompass the 
other players of the financial world, such as financial enterprises, insurers, investment firms, 
other market infrastructure providers or entities engaged in ‘shadow banking’ activities. The 
scope of the system is as wide as it is with the admittance of the fact, that it is not only credit 
institutions that can pose a threat to the stability of the financial system.
23
 Nevertheless, it 
would be firmly a major success to create an effective unified supervision at least over the 
banking-sector solely. Not underestimating other sectors, there is a firm assumption that with 
a consolidated European level bank supervision, so with a well-functioning bank-sector, 
Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crisis could not have happened in the form as it has.  
 
Thirdly, the SSM Regulation comprises provisions only on essential tasks of credit 
institutions. The evaluation criteria of essential tasks will be profoundly unfolded in the next 
chapter due to structural reasons.  
 
Fourthly, the SSM Regulation concerns only to credit institutions, which are evaluated by the 
ECB as significant ones. The Council has adopted this approach during the legislative 
procedure, which reduced the credit institutions subject to direct ECB supervision from 6.000 
to approximately 150, but nevertheless representing around 80% of the banking assets in the 
Euro Area.
24
 As regards the evaluation procedure itself, both the SSM Regulation and the 
Draft ECB Framework Regulation contain specific detailed provisions. In summary, this legal 
background provides 5 (five) essential criteria which make possible to decide whether a credit 
institution can be described as a significant one or not. These are the following: the size of the 
institution (i.); the national/EU economic importance threshold (ii.); the level of cross-border 
activity (iii.); the requisitioning of public financial assistance from the European Stability 
Mechanism (iv.) and finally the criteria for determining the 3 (three) most significant banks in 
a participating Member State (v.). 
i. As regards the size criteria, the regulations contain unequivocal rules for 
determination. With respect of point (i) of the first subparagraph of Article 6 (4) of the SSM 
Regulation, point (i) of the second subparagraph provides detailed rules on how to assess the 
                                                 
22
 Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 
23
 Ferran, Babis, 2013, p. 5 
24
 ibid, p. 4 
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size of a bank in relation to evaluating significance. A credit institution should be considered 
as significant, if the total value of its assets exceeds Euro 30 billion. The legal background is 
useful and complete in itself, since the ECB Framework Regulation shall provide the basis 
also for the evaluation process.
25
 It is a decisive factor in determining size how to assess 
groups of credit institutions, since Europe’s financial sector is highly interconnected. To 
exclude the possibility for groups to avoid the supervision of the SSM, all credit institutions 
that are part of a significant group will be subject to direct supervision by the ECB on a 
consolidated and on an individual basis as well.
26
 Nevertheless, some of the details are still 
unclear.
27
 
ii. As regards the national/EU economic importance threshold, the regulation is complete. 
On the basis of point (ii) of the first subparagraph of Article 6 (4) and point (ii) of the second 
subparagraph of the same Article of the SSM Regulation, Article 56 and 57 of the Draft ECB 
Framework Regulation lay down that if the ratio of the bank’s total assets over the GDP of the 
participating Member State of establishment exceeds 20 %, the bank is determined as 
significant, unless the total value of its assets is below Euro 5 billion. It means that beside the 
absolute criteria of size, another relative threshold is set up. This relative threshold takes into 
consideration the ratio between smaller Member States and their banks determinative to their 
economy, even below of the absolute criteria of size. It is an important step towards the 
creation of a prudential environment on EU level, since these banks below the size criteria can 
get in the scope of the SSM, and that is how smaller Member States can benefit from the 
security of the supervision of the ECB. It is not that difficult to admit that even though these 
banks in themselves do not mean any threat to the European financial sector, they are able to 
cause significant problems to their home countries. The crisis of even a small Member State 
can easily continue to spill over and become a European-wide trouble, as we had the chance to 
see in relation to Member States, such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain.
28
 
                                                 
25
 Article 51 (1) and (2) of the Draft ECB Framework Regulation: ”If the supervised entity is part of a supervised 
group, the total value of its assets shall be determined on the basis of the year-end prudential consolidated 
reporting for the supervised group in accordance with applicable law. If total assets cannot be determined on the 
basis of the data referred to in paragraph 1, the total value of assets shall be determined on the basis of the most 
recent audited consolidated annual accounts prepared in accordance with IFRS and, if those annual accounts are 
not available, the consolidated annual accounts prepared in accordance with applicable national accounting 
laws.” 
26
 Public Consultation on the Draft ECB Framework Regulation, 2014, p. 8 
27
 Szombati, 2014 
28
 Roubini, 2010, p. 34 
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iii. In conformity with point (iii) of the first subparagraph of Article 6 (4) and the third 
subparagraph of the same Article of the SSM Regulation, Article 59 of the Draft ECB 
Framework Regulation creates a pattern how the significance of cross-border activities can be 
proved. According to the cited article, a supervised group may be considered significant by 
the ECB on the basis of its cross-border activities only when the parent undertaking of a 
supervised group has established subsidiaries, which are themselves credit institutions, in 
more than one other participating Member State. Such a group may be considered significant, 
only if the ratio of its cross-border assets to its total assets is above 10 %; or (b) the ratio of its 
cross-border liabilities to its total liabilities is above 10 %. In the light of this finalised system 
of provisions on the evaluation of significance based on the cross-border criteria, it can be 
contended that Stijn Verhelst’s opinion is irrational when he says “the legislators have left it 
to the ECB to provide a precise methodology for this criterion”.29 In fact, it is the ECB’s task 
to provide a precise methodology for each of the criterions, but the cited sentence pretences an 
impression like it is true only in relation to the cross-border criteria.  
iv. According to the fourth subparagraph of Article 6 (4) of the SSM Regulation, those 
banks for which public financial assistance has been requested or received from the European 
Financial Stability Facility or the European Stability Mechanism shall not be considered less 
significant.
30
 However, in case of financial assistance received, this criterion is unnecessary, 
since it is available only for banks with a systemic relevance or with a pose of a serious threat 
to the financial stability of the Euro-area as a whole or of its Member States. This systemic 
dimension in question shall be assessed taking into account, primarily, their size, 
interconnectedness, complexity, and substitutability,
31
 so mainly the same assessment shall be 
taken as it is in relation to point (i) regarding the criteria of size.  
v. The Single Supervisory Mechanism needs to cover the most significant banks in each 
participating Member State. Continuing this thought, the fifth subparagraph of Article 6 (4) of 
the SSM Regulation lays down that the ECB shall carry out the tasks of the SSM, in respect of 
the 3 (three) most significant banks in each of the participating Member States, disregarding 
their size, their influence on the national/EU economy, their cross-border activity or the fact 
that they might require or receive financial assistance from the EFSF or the SRM. The Draft 
                                                 
29
 Verhelst, 2013, p. 19 
30
 The detailed rules of determining the request or receipt of direct public financial assistance can be found in 
Article 61 of the Draft ECB Framework Regulation. 
31
 Article 3 (2) of the ESM Guideline, 2013 
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ECB Framework Regulation provides the detailed background and lays down what it means to 
be 1 (one) of the 3 (three) most significant banks in a participating Member State. Stijn 
Verhelst is just partly right, when he contends the following: “the value of assets and cross-
border activity seem the most relevant criteria”32 in determining the 3 (three) most significant 
banks. In fact, Article 65 (2) of the Draft ECB Framework Regulation lays down that the 
size
33
 of the supervised entity and supervised group respectively shall be taken into account in 
the determination of the 3 (three) most significant banks in each of the participating Member 
States, and cross-border activity shall not be taken into consideration at all.  
 
The place of the SSM in the EU’s financial supervisory landscape34 
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V.3. TASKS AND POWERS CONFERRED TO THE ECB 
 
V.3.1. PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISORY TASKS OF THE ECB 
 
As I mentioned in the third subparagraph of the previous chapter and as it can be seen on the 
figure of the previous page, the Single Supervisory Mechanism comprises provisions only on 
essential tasks of banks. Article 127(6) TFEU permits the conferral on the ECB of these 
specific tasks concerning prudential supervision.
35
 This particular chapter is devoted only to 
tasks and powers conferred to the ECB, since according to my assessment − beside the scope 
− this is the next significant pillar of the SSM Regulation.  
 
Article 4 of the SSM Regulation lists the prudential tasks of the ECB, including in particular: 
authorising and withdrawing authorisation of credit institutions; assessing the implications for 
the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in credit institutions; ensuring compliance 
with the EU rules on own funds requirements, securitisation, large exposure limits, liquidity, 
leverage, and reporting and public disclosure of information on those matters; ensuring 
compliance with governance arrangements, risk management processes, internal control 
mechanisms, remuneration policies and practices and effective internal capital adequacy 
assessment processes; carrying out supervisory reviews, including stress tests, on the basis of 
which to impose on credit institutions specific requirements; carrying out supervisory tasks in 
relation to recovery plans, and early intervention where a supervised entity does not meet or is 
likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements.
36
  
 
In addition to that, point g) of Article 4 (1) and Article 4 (2) of the SSM Regulation confer 
special tasks to the ECB, in relation to cross-border activity. The above-cited provisions lay 
down that the ECB shall be competent to carry out participation in supervision in relation to 
parents not established in one of the participating Member State. For these credit institutions 
established in a non-participating Member State, which establish a branch or provide cross- 
border services in a participating Member State, the ECB shall carry out the tasks for which 
the national competent authorities are responsible. As it can be read from these provisions, the 
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ECB shall play an important role in the supervision of parent credit institutions, established in 
a non-participating Member State. This role will comprise all the forms, in which a credit 
institution is able to expand its operations to the territory of another country. These 3 (three) 
forms are the following. In case of establishing a subsidiary in an SSM country by a credit 
institution incorporated in a non-participating Member State, the ECB shall participate in 
supervision on a consolidated basis. In the second case of establishing a branch in an SSM 
country by a credit institution incorporated in a non-participating Member State, the ECB 
shall carry out the tasks for which the national competent authorities are competent. In the 
third case of providing cross-border services in an SSM country by a credit institution 
incorporated in a non-participating Member State, the ECB’s tasks will be the same as in the 
second case. Regarding the fact that the ECB shall apply all relevant Union law, and where 
this Union law is composed of Regulations and where currently those Regulations explicitly 
grant options for Member States, the ECB shall apply also the national legislation exercising 
those options,
37
 one of the most pivotal challenges will be which the ECB shall face with, if 
the workforce of the ECB shall have to apply the 28 (twenty-eight) different national 
legislations in order to fulfil its tasks. It assumes a wide range of professionals going to work 
for the ECB. This implies a higher level of transition between the European and the national 
supervision channels.  
 
Although the Single Supervisory Mechanism shall comprise the major tasks of prudential 
supervision, there are several tasks, which remain under national control even in relation to 
the Euro-zone countries. These tasks are called non-essential supervisory tasks, such as − inter 
alia – supervisory steps against money laundering and terrorist financing, consumer protection 
and supervising cross-border activity of banks incorporated in countries outside the EU. 
However, in summary, taking into account all the above-mentioned tasks, disregarding their 
essential or non-essential nature, the essential tasks comprised by the SSM appear to cover the 
pivotal elements of bank supervision in the EU.
38
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V.3.2. PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISORY POWERS OF THE ECB 
 
Regarding the increased level of cooperation in the field of financial supervision in Europe, 
the integration view of central banking and bank supervision seems to be the new consensus. 
Such integration is designed in Article 127 (6) of TFEU, which contemplates that the ECB 
could take particular powers in the area of banking supervision.
39
 
 
Some of the prudential powers of the ECB relate to all banks, disregarding their significance 
and are initiated by the national supervisors with the ultimate decision coming from the ECB. 
The procedures of authorisation and withdrawal of authorisation of banks or the authorisation 
for the acquisition and disposal of significant holdings do not depend on the significant nature 
of the credit institutions in question. For all other supervisory activities, the distinction 
between significant and less significant banks will apply, in the sense that these activities will 
be directly performed by the ECB in the case of the significant institutions while for the less 
significant ones, directly by the national supervisors.
40
 As regards the powers related to the 
less significant credit institutions, it is shared between the ECB and the national competent 
authorities, due to a better allocation of powers and related tasks between the European and 
the national level. In that sense, it is hard to interpret the Public Consultation
41
, when it says: 
“The ECB has an overall and exclusive competence as regards the granting and withdrawal of 
authorisations and the assessment of the acquisition of qualifying holdings in relation to all 
supervised entities”.42 It is not exclusive in the sense, that the national competent authorities 
are the point of entry for an application in both procedures. They carry out the first assessment 
of the application based on the conditions laid down under national law. If it considers that the 
application complies with those conditions, it prepares a draft decision to the ECB. The ECB 
may agree or object to the positive draft decision of the NCA: it takes a final decision to adopt 
or to reject the draft decision, i.e. whether to grant the authorisation or not. On the other hand, 
the NCA has the power to reject the application without the permission of the ECB, in that 
sense NCA’s exercise real power in relation to these 2 (two) particular procedures.  
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Prudential Supervisory Powers of the ECB according to the SSM Regulation in relation to the 
Euro-zone 
 
 
 
V.4. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SSM 
 
In this chapter a brief review shall be provided on the organizational structure and decision-
making bodies of the Single Supervisory Mechanism to reveal how the system operates in the 
everyday work, how the powers conferred to the ECB can be applied and how the tasks can be 
performed. Three main decision-making procedures can be separated on the basis that what 
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kinds of bodies are involved and to what extent. First, there is the general procedure in case of 
credit institutions of the Euro-zone Member States, whose participation is not based on a 
close-cooperation mechanism. Second, there is a special procedure in case of authorizing a 
credit institution to take up the business and for the assessment of acquisitions of qualifying 
holdings.  Third, there is a modified process for countries participating outside the Euro-zone 
under the mechanism of a close-cooperation. In the following, a summary shall be provided 
on the former 2 (two), meanwhile the latter shall be examined in the following chapter of The 
possibility of close cooperation for Member States out of the Euro zone (Chapter VI.). 
 
V.4.1. GENERAL PROCEDURE 
 
As it can be seen in the figure below, the general decision-making process of the SSM is a 
linear mechanism separated into a level performing examination of the supervised entities, 
another level for decision-making and a third one for administrative revision of the decisions.  
 
On the first level there are the Joint Supervisory Teams (JST) facing with significant 
workload, in particular their tasks include performing the supervisory review and evaluation 
process for the significant supervised entity or group that it supervises and proposing to the 
Supervisory Board a supervisory examination program in relation to the supervised entity.
43
 A 
joint supervisory team shall be established for the supervision of each significant supervised 
entity or group in each participating Member State. Each Joint Supervisory Team shall be 
composed of members from the ECB and the national competent authorities as well, with a 
JST coordinator in charge designated by the ECB.
44
  
 
On the next level, we can find the Supervisory Board, which undertakes the planning and 
execution of the tasks conferred to the ECB. In this process, the Governing Council is the only 
entity, which has the power to oppose the Supervisory Board’s decisions, however in fact it is 
unlikely to happen so frequently.
45
 Draft decisions of the Supervisory Board will be deemed 
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adopted unless the Governing Council objects in a short period.
46
 Although the Supervisory 
Board is not a decision-making body de iure, it will play such a role de facto.
47
  
 
Finally, Article 24 of the SSM Regulation creates the possibility of internal administrative 
review of the decisions made by the Governing Council.  
 
General decision-making process of the SSM 
 
 
V.4.2. SPECIAL PROCEDURE 
 
In case of authorization, the withdrawal of authorization and the assessment of acquisition of 
qualifying holdings, the SSM Regulation
48
 and regarding the detailed procedural provisions 
the Draft SSM Framework Regulation
49
 provide different rules in comparison with the general 
procedure. As regards these 2 (two) issues, there shall be a wider cooperation between the 
ECB and the national competent authorities. Here the legal background delegates more power 
to national level, as the tasks of assessment of the authorization and the preparation of a draft 
decision is appended to the NCAs. In the second stage, the NCAs propose the draft decision to 
the ECB. At the final stage the ECB shall decide on granting or rejecting the authorization. 
This kind of division of labor is highly necessary, since for instance in case of authorization of 
new banks, there is no basis to evaluate whether the new entity shall be significant or not, so 
the final decision is made by the ECB, disregarding the further significant or less significant 
nature of the new entity.
50
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V.4.3. ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Regarding individual decisions, accountability is performed by the possibility of turning to the 
Board of Review. This is an internal remedy to avoid illegality for the parties, since it can be 
initiated against Governing Council decisions by private and legal persons, also including the 
supervised credit institutions.  
 
As regards the overall operation of the SSM, there are significant checks and balances in the 
system, thus the ECB’s independence can remain remarkable, the ECB has become one of the 
most independent central banks in the world.
51
 The strength of this independence is coming 
from the stringent system of bodies accounting the ECB. The ECB is accountable for the 
submission of an annual report on the tasks carried out to the European Parliament, to the 
Council, to the Commission and to the Euro group.
52
 Furthermore, the ECB is subject to 
internal and external audits by the European Union Court of Auditors.
53
 Finally, at the end of 
the day the ECB decisions − as any other legal act within the territory of the EU – are subject 
to the review procedure of the European Court of Justice, with the words of Masciandaro and 
J. Nieto: “the ECB as bank supervisor is accountable ex post to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for the legality of its actions”.54  
 
As regards this list of examiner bodies, it is evident that the accountability is strict and valid 
towards the institutions of the EU, but they are much less effective in direct relation to the 
Member States. Although the SSM Regulation encompasses provisions on the control license 
of the national parliaments,
55
 these mechanisms are enervate since, they consist only options 
for the ECB on which the ECB can motivate its decision to cooperate with the national 
parliaments and submit them the annual report or answer their reasoned observations or may 
accept the invitation of a national parliament. There is no binding effect in these acts, it is 
absolutely based on the ECB’s willingness whether they cooperate or not. On the other hand, 
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although there is no legal binding effect in the acts of Member States in this relation, it is hard 
to imagine that the ECB would refuse the invitation of a national parliament, without losing 
face, without losing from its high-rated reputation.  
 
 
VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF A CLOSE COOPERATION FOR MEMBER STATES OUT 
OF THE EURO ZONE 
 
Since the SSM Regulation delegates all the supreme powers of decision-making to the 
Governing Council, consist of Chairs of the national banks of Member States within the Euro-
zone, the current legal framework does not offer the possibility that the decisions of the ECB 
Governing Council are directly applicable and binding in Member States outside the Euro-
zone. This situation is perfectly articulated by Verhelst
56
 as follows: “In a nutshell, the Treaty 
stipulates that non-euro zone countries are not allowed to vote in the final decision-making 
body of the ECB, nor are non-euro zone countries bound by decisions made by the ECB.”. 
 
On the other hand, there is a huge need for supervisory unification, for instance because of the 
internationally over-connected structure of credit institutions within the union. To avoid 
fragmentation and the further splitting of the union to core Member States and peripheral 
Member States, the decision-makers had to come up with a solution, which grants − at least 
the possibility – for Member States outside the Euro-zone to join the system. However, it 
cannot be more than a dispositive rule, a voluntary feasibility, as regards the composition of 
the supreme decision-making body of the SSM. Hence, on the decision of the Member State 
concerned, to join the system within the framework of a close-cooperation agreement, it has to 
undertake that it abides itself to the ECB’s guidelines and requests and to provide all relevant 
information the ECB may require and has harmonised relevant national legislation.
57
  
 
As regards the comparison between the status of SSM Member States within the Euro-zone, 
and Member States outside the Euro-zone signing a close cooperation agreement, 2 (two) 
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main differences can be observed. First, the opposition between the practices of direct and 
indirect supervision of the ECB regarding significant supervised entities has to be mentioned. 
Second, the different complication rate between SSM Member States within the Euro-zone, 
and Member States outside the Euro-zone signing a close cooperation agreement has to be 
emphasized. 
 
Regarding the first criteria, in the system of close cooperation, the national competent 
authorities should take the measures required by the ECB. An ECB decision can manifest only 
in the form of requests. These requests do not have a direct binding effect within the national 
legislations, so they have to be transplanted to the decisions of the national competent 
authorities. If the ECB had to address a decision to a supervised entity or supervised group, 
the ECB would, instead of addressing a decision to a supervised entity or supervised group, 
issue instructions to the NCA in close cooperation and that NCA would address a decision to 
a supervised entity or supervised group in accordance with such instructions.
58
 In other words, 
if the ECB considers that a measure should be adopted by the NCA in relation to a significant 
supervised entity or group, it shall address to that NCA: a general or specific instruction, a 
request or a guideline requiring the issuance of a supervisory decision in relation to that 
significant supervised entity or significant supervised group in the participating Member 
State. In respect of a less significant supervised entity or less significant supervised group, 
specific instruction cannot be addressed.
59
 To be able to meet the criteria, one pre-requisite for 
the signing of the close cooperation agreement is the passing of the Capital Requirements 
Regulation and its complement the fourth Capital Requirements Directive. This is necessary 
so that the SSM can implement a harmonized supervisory rulebook based on the Basel III 
accord instead of the currently in place and different national regulations.
60
 
 
 If a NCA does not transplant any particular request of the ECB into a formal decision of the 
NCA, the ECB does not have any tool to enforce the request, except to force the Member 
State concerned to leave the close-cooperation status, so the SSM as well. On the other hand, 
the NCA should be cautious, since in the system of close cooperation, it shall be liable for any 
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damage resulting from its failure to apply any ECB measure, instruction, request or guideline 
in a timely manner.
61
 So basically, the main difference is laying on the possibility of the ECB 
to issue direct decisions towards the supervised credit institutions. Within the Euro-zone the 
ECB has direct supervisory power, outside indirect, via national supervisory authorities. 
 
Second, non-euro area Member States in close cooperation who disagree with a draft decision 
of the Supervisory Board only have a right to send their reasoned disagreement in order not to 
be bound by the pertinent decision if the Governing Council does not confirm the non-euro 
area Member State‘s objection. If the Governing Council does not change its contested 
decision, the only remaining resort lies in the immediate termination of the close cooperation 
on the affected Member State‘s request.62 However, there are no widespread means in the 
hands of the NCA’s in case of disagreement, the last resort, namely quitting from the system 
is quite simple to achieve. So in case of disagreement, the participating Member State can 
decide to temporarily or permanently leave the SSM as it can suspend or terminate its 
membership. Nevertheless this option is absolutely closed for Member States, inside the Euro-
zone.  
 
The ECB will exercise supervision on these banking groups on the same terms as applicable 
in the euro-area jurisdictions. Whether the ECB will be competent, or the national supervisor 
in that state depends on the quantitative and other criteria, whereby the consolidated data at 
the level of the parent will determine whether ECB or national supervision will apply, whether 
the credit institution concerned is evaluated as significant or less significant. In case of inward 
investment by a significant group, the ECB will be in fully charge of the parent company and 
of the branches, services and subsidiaries wherever located in the SSM area, being all 
participating states. A comparable national regime will be applicable to the less significant 
groups, where the supervision will be exercised by the national supervisors, of the home state 
for the parent and its branches and its service provision, and of the host state for the 
subsidiaries.
63
 In other terms, according to Article 116 (1) of the Draft SSM Framework 
Regulation, an NCA in close cooperation shall adopt decisions in respect of significant 
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supervised entities and significant supervised groups in its Member State only on the ECB’s 
instructions. The NCA in close cooperation may also request instructions from the ECB. 
 
 
The coordination of credit institutions under direct ECB supervision  
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VII. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A CLOSE COOPERATION 
 
VII.1. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF PROS AND CONS 
 
As regards the general assessment on whether a non-euro zone Member State should join the 
SSM or not, a number of issues have to be considered. For a better understanding, the list of 
these issues is provided below in the structure of separating between general approaches valid 
for each Member State and Member State-specific approaches, valid only in relation to 
Hungary. In this chapter, I take into account the general approaches that each non-euro zone 
Member State has to take into consideration.  
 
According to the creators of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the system shall provide 
harmony, effectiveness and strong accountability all across the participating Member States.
64
 
Harmonised legislation is coming into fruition, not only in relation to the Euro-zone Member 
States, but among countries out of the zone. However, joining to the SSM could mean a 
significant indicator in this process, which gives a framework and guarantee further 
integration as well. Fostering effective governance by the SSM is a just theoretical effect of 
the system so far, since it shall be the question of time whether the different levels of the 
SSM’s decision-making structure will be able to provide the system with effectiveness. As 
regards accountability, the SSM has exceptionally stringent system of checks and balances 
towards diverse EU institutions. For a non-euro zone Member State the real question is 
whether it would be worth to give up significant parts of the national accountability system 
and shift them to EU level or not. For instance, in case of the UK, they decided not to cede 
any elements of the sovereignty of its financial supervision, since the enormous impact of the 
UK financial sector in relation to the whole economy. 
 
The next significant incentive could be the evolutional nature of the SSM, since it is just one 
stage in the evolution of the banking union. The previous step was the creation of a Single 
Rulebook, which contains the substantive provisions of financial supervision in the form of 
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CRR
65
 and CRDIV.
66
 As regards the SSM, the ECB shall exercise the powers conferred to it 
by the SSM Regulation from the 4
th
 of November 2014. The next step shall be the 
introduction of the Single Resolution Mechanism, which will be able to offer a European-
level solution for bank resolutions. The final stage would be a European common deposit 
guarantee system.
67
 The most attractive element of the banking union is definitely the 
common deposit guarantee system, which could act as a powerful European umbrella in case 
of some non-euro zone Member States’ financial and sovereign debt crisis.  
 
As regards the competitive disadvantage of non-participating Member States, a number of 
arguments need to be considered carefully. First, delaying a decision on joining the SSM 
increases the uncertainty for the concerned credit institutions. This uncertainty is able to 
justify delays of operational and investment decisions of the credit institutions concerned, so 
is able to increase the uncertainty and cause competitive disadvantage. Moreover, there is also 
a competitive disadvantage of credit institutions which are not owned by a parent credit 
institution headquartered in an SSM country.
68
 This risk is articulated by Darvas and Wolff, in 
their preparatory work prepared for a hearing at the Danish parliament: “When a Member 
State stays outside of the SSM, then domestically owned banks and those banks that do not 
have a parent bank in a SSM participating member state may face a competitive disadvantage. 
If supervision by the ECB will be regarded as an important safeguard in the assessment of the 
soundness of banks, then staying out may imply higher financing costs: both the cost of 
wholesale funding may be relatively higher and the depositors may also require a higher 
interest rate.”69  
 
The participating non-euro zone Member States can face also with the advantage of accession 
to all the relevant information they acquire on formal and informal channels of cooperation 
with the ECB inside the inner procedures of the SSM. It shall mean a significant benefit, 
especially in the supervision of the cross-border activity of European-wide banking groups.  
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Another, non-negligible factor of participation is the possibility of contribution to the shaping 
of the practical operation of the SSM. The Governing Council as well as the Supervisory 
Board will have to set the rules of the practical operation of the SSM. This will be done at an 
early phase and will likely shape in a fundamental way the effectiveness and inclusiveness of 
the new mechanism. While according to the regulation, non-euro members most likely can 
join formally only after the system has been set up, a clear and early signal to join the SSM is 
likely to increase the voice of non-euro Member States in shaping the modalities. At the same 
time, however, the modalities have to be in line with the draft technical standards, guidelines, 
and recommendations prepared by the EBA. This argument therefore calls for an early 
indication of the intention to join.
70
 
 
Due to the ECB’s lack of powers in relation to non-euro zone Member States, the possible 
signing of a close cooperation agreement and the legal relationship behind it provide easy 
escape routes for the close co-operators in case of changing their minds. If a significant 
disagreement gives the reason to do so, the agreement can be terminated quite easily. Both the 
ECB and the non-euro zone SSM Member State can decide on such termination. In case of a 
possible termination by the ECB, there are 2 (two) options available. First, the ECB issues a 
warning to a Member State stating that it does not respect one of the three conditions laid 
down in the SSM Regulation.
71
 The cited article of the regulation contends that close 
cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a participating Member 
State whose currency is not the euro shall be established, if the Member State concerned 
undertakes that its national competent authority will abide by any formal opinion issued by 
the ECB. It also has to undertake that it will provide all relevant information necessary for a 
comprehensive assessment of credit institutions supervised by the ECB, and  finally the 
Member State concerned also has to undertake to enter into the close cooperation relationship 
in relation to all credit institutions established in that certain Member State. If the country 
does not take sufficient action after such a warning, the ECB can end the close cooperation 
agreement. In the second option, the Governing Council objects to a decision by the 
Supervisory Board. Since the non-euro zone country does not have any representatives in the 
Governing Council, it can then notify the Governing Council that it objects to the decision. If 
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the Governing Council nonetheless sticks to its decision, the non-euro zone country can 
choose not to apply the supervisory decision. This is the situation when the Governing 
Council could decide on the suspension or termination of the close cooperation agreement. 
Terminating the close cooperation agreement is easier for the non-euro zone country even 
more than it is for the ECB. A non-euro zone participating Member State can end the 
agreement whenever it disagrees with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board. Furthermore, 
if a country has been part of the SSM for more than 3 years, it can even choose to end the 
close cooperation agreement without any specific formal reason. The feedback loop, however, 
is that if a Member State has terminated the close cooperation relationship, it cannot enter 
again into it for a period of 3 (three) years. On the other hand, using these provisions could 
even cause non-easy effects as well. First, these provisions could delay a Member States’ 
entry into the Eurozone, as the Eurozone would surely not accept a country to enter the 
Monetary Union without being part of the SSM.
72
 Second, although these provisions on the 
easy secession of the SSM may not place any serious legal pressure on the Member State 
concerned, they can result in hard political and economic difficulties. A Member State in the 
situation concerned may face political distrust and may leave a message to the markets saying 
it does not pursue to have a European-wide transparent supervisory system with strong checks 
and balances, but wants to stay in the dark.  
 
 
VII.2. ADVANTAGES OF A CLOSE COOPERATION SPECIFICALLY IN RELATION TO 
HUNGARY 
 
As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, beside the general approaches valid for each 
Member State, there are country-specific conditions likely in relation to each Member State, 
hence Hungary is no exception. In the following, the list of country-specific advantages 
related to Hungary will be provided in prioritization. 
 
According to my assessment most importantly, with an immediate declaration of the will of 
participation, Hungary has an unrepeatable chance to declare its commitment to the EU 
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integration, more specifically to the Single Supervisory Mechanism and to the ECB as well. 
The ECB’s broad analytical possibilities and its independent experts have the chance to 
observe the national financial system more objectively, without any form of outer influence, 
which can help both the structural and the cyclical risks to be recognized in time. This can be 
considered as a significant merit by the analysts and the investors as well. The positive 
expectations and the favourable mood of the investors about the banking union likely can 
affect the domestic banks’ external source supply situation. In addition, because of the high 
reputation of the ECB, the cost of funding may decrease and credit rating agencies are likely 
to assign a lower probability of sovereign debt crises, meanwhile improving the Member 
State’s credit assessment. Based on the above-mentioned facts and according to market 
players, investors and credit rating agencies, it can be concluded that the highest added-value 
of the SSM is its reputation, specifically coming from its unified methodology fortified by the 
stringent system of checks and balances, which is able to guarantee the avoidance of outer 
influences. As regards the decision on the participation in the SSM by Hungary, it can be 
contended that the professional reputation of the National Bank of Hungary is lower than the 
ECB’s. According to my assessment, this economic effect is more significant than any other 
legal one.  
 
The second supporting reason is that since the participation is expected to inflict positive 
reactions from the market due to the above-mentioned fact that the ECB’s reputation is far 
stronger than the reputation of the national competent authorities, so if the majority of the 
Member States are joining, it shall be a concrete competitive disadvantage for those Member 
States who stay out, and a concrete funding disadvantage for those credit institutions who 
operate in those Member States. This progress makes the competitive disadvantage the second 
most significant economic effect of non-participation. However, according to the information 
available now, in May, 2014 the majority of non-euro zone Member States have already 
decided not to join, or reluctant to provide a unequivocal response. The following figure is 
able to express the uncertainty of the situation.  
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The relationship between the banking union and the Member States
73
 
 
 
 
The third supporting reason is coming from the evolutionary nature of the banking union, 
more specifically from the next stage of that, namely the creation of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism. In December 2012 the European Council Conclusions stated that “the European 
Commission will submit in the course of 2013 a proposal for a single resolution mechanism 
for Member States participating in the SSM, to be examined by the co-legislators as a matter 
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of priority with the intention of adopting it during the current parliamentary cycle”.74 From 
another aspect, the interaction between global financial stability, cross-border banking and 
preserving a national resolution authority is the crucial problem. The relationship between 
these 3 (three) legal institutions is referred to as financial trilemma.
75
 The elements of the 
financial trilemma are hard to be combined, bank resolution is not well defined at a cross-
border level. The trilemma is even more pressing when banks have a larger international 
exposure and when they are operating in a monetary union. If credit institutions will be 
supervised under the umbrella of a Single Supervisory Mechanism, a Single Resolution 
Mechanism is the appropriate next step. Such a mechanism ensures that when a credit 
institution fails under the SSM, the failure can be resolved in an appropriate manner.
76
 This is 
underlined by a review of major cross-border bank failures, which revealed that national 
resolution powers are often inadequate, leading to costly, inefficient and national interventions 
were proved ineffective sometimes. So the adoption of the SRM could prove to be a major 
step forward in this respect.
77
 In this regard, the SRM shall likely be a significant guarantee 
tool, especially in case of relative small and vulnerable economies, such as Hungary. It is a 
major reason to participate in the SSM, so in the whole progress of banking union as well, if 
Hungary shall have access to the 55 (fifty-five) billion Euros of resolution fund, which shall 
be available to all participating Member States in case of preventing the next crisis. In 
prevention, there is no need to use this protective umbrella perforce. There are some cases, in 
which the mere existence of the Single Resolution System is enough to avoid the escalation of 
an upcoming crisis. It can happen that without the realized financial aid of this system the 
mere existence of participation is able to suggest trust to the markets, so creates the possibility 
of recovery.  
 
The fourth supporting reason is the effect of personal presence. By joining the first round of 
admission, Hungary would have its greatest chance to earn influence. In that case, Hungarian 
experts and managers may have the chance to be admitted to the ECB in an appropriate 
number, so they would have the ability to represent broadly the special Hungarian aspects and 
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the special knowledge needed for the supervision of the domestic credit institutions.
78
 On the 
other hand, as a result of this possibility, Hungary would have the chance to get closer to the 
mainstream of European integration, and especially to the new methods of financial 
supervision and crisis management.  
 
VII.3. RISKS OF A CLOSE COOPERATION SPECIFICALLY IN RELATION TO HUNGARY 
 
The possibility of the participation in the Single Supervisory Mechanism has several benefits 
in relation to the participating Member States however, almost each advantage has 2 (two) 
faces, and during a comprehensive assessment the negative sides can be discovered as well. In 
the following, I try to summarize these “negative sides” of participation and compare them 
with the advantages they offer in the same time. Regarding the conclusion, the official opinion 
of the National Bank of Hungary and my own assessment will be relied on.  
 
On one hand, the immediate admission has several benefits, as it could be seen in the previous 
chapter. On the other hand, it contains some risks as well. The risks of immediate accession 
can be summarized by the unproven structural framework of the SSM and the untested 
mechanisms, in particular the opacity of annual decision-making in relation to bank groups 
(capital, liquidity) and the lack of exercise in handling crisis situations. This could lead to 
significant gaps in monitoring and early intervention or to the enforcement of weaknesses. In 
the EU context, bank regulation is viewed as harmonized and decentralised supervision has 
been seen as the main problem. Paradoxically, the SSM potentially entails the opposite risk, 
i.e. having a centralised supervisory mechanism, which relies on a partially harmonized 
rulebook. This risk is highlighted because recent experience has shown that the adoption of 
the single rulebook is far from straightforward, and its ‘single’ element has been pushed down 
significantly in the various stages of negotiations in order to accommodate preferences of the 
Member States.
79
 By the time being, the result of the comprehensive assessment and stress 
test are not foreseeable. It can eventuate in serious market uncertainty, if results reveal that 
possibly several significant credit institution shall need capital increase at the same time. Such 
a situation may imply an exaggerated investor conduct, resulting in the increase of market 
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risk. For this reason, it is essential to operate the supervisory mechanisms for domestic credit 
institutions in a well-functioning manner, in particular as regards the cooperation between the 
micro-prudential and macro-prudential branches of the national bank.
80
 According to the 
assessment of the National Bank of Hungary, this aim could be achieved more likely within 
the framework of the national system, which is − in comparison with the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism – a more tested pattern. It is, because – regarding the deficiencies of the former 
supervisory structure – in October 2013 there was a political will melting the National 
Financial Supervisory Authority into the national bank and creating a new provisional 
background. Thus, the creation of this new system could be fully subject to the forthcoming 
European financial rule, and in particular to the legal framework of the banking union.  
 
In relation to Hungary, the biggest attraction could be the Single Resolution Mechanism, with 
its fund of 55 billion Euros, paid in by all the European banks no later than 2024. The 
ECOFIN Council reached an agreement on the Single Resolution Mechanism, the second leg 
of a banking union, at a meeting on 18th of December 2013. This provides a base to start 
negotiations on the SRM with the European Parliament. The Council expects the proposal to 
be adopted before the European elections in May 2014.
81
 However, the SRM itself cannot 
justify the positive decision on participation. As community resources for crisis management 
not yet available, so in extreme cases it may be found that the costs of a banking crisis shall be 
paid by domestic taxpayers, as it would happen without joining the banking union, but with a 
decision only much later born on European level. Moreover, in extreme cases, it is also 
conceivable that in case of the resolution of a significant European bank; even the national 
contribution to the SRM has to be used for finance the resolution of that significant bank 
concerned.
82
  
 
Regarding the professional reputation of the ECB, it is highly incontestable that the MNB's 
professional reputation is far behind the ECB's, but here it is also worthwhile to point out that 
there shall be very strong fire walls – sometimes referred to as Chinese wall − between the 
ECB's branch, responsible for monetary policy and the branch responsible for supervision and 
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organization, which precludes any form of interaction in theory. If it comes to fruition, then 
the supervisory branch of the ECB will have to build up its own creditability, which has to be 
− at least partly − independent from the reputation of the ECB responsible for monetary 
issues. In this regard, the SSM has to build up its own creditability. In building up its own 
creditability, currently the most important step is the Asset Quality Review and the stress test. 
As the results of these are expected only at the end of 2014, until this deadline it will not be 
revealed whether banks with inappropriate assets fail or not. Since in many Member States the 
national resolution mechanisms will be operational only in 2015 and state intervention on 
capital increase is profoundly restricted by competition rules, it is unpredictable whether the 
ECB would change its mind and prescribe lower capital requirements to avoid the possibility 
of bank bailouts. Thus, the MNB’s supervisorial credibility is being put to the same test. To 
pass the test, the MNB has already tried to meet 2 (two) requirements. First, an arrangement 
has been settled that the MNB shall use the asset quality review and the stress test based on 
ECB methodology including the participation of an external consultant in relation to the OTP 
Group, the only Hungarian-owned bank, which would be considered as a significant one 
according to the SSM Regulation. Second, the MNB has access to all the relevant information 
related to the foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in Hungary, so in the possession of those it 
has the ability to make responsible decisions.
83
 In that sense, there is no need to shift under the 
umbrella of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.  
 
Some say that the trust of the markets can be earned easier if there are external control 
mechanisms in the system of financial supervision, hence the mere existence of a participation 
decision can calm down the investors’ nervousness. For this reason, the mere participation in 
the SSM has the heritage of better economic outlooks. However, according to the opinion of 
the MNB, it is not true by all means. Since the ESRB has the possibility to issue 
recommendations if not adequately treated systemic risk is detected in Hungary, external 
control already exists.
84
 Nevertheless, this control exercised by the ESRB is far less powerful 
than the outer control mechanisms, provided by the SSM.  
 
                                                 
83
 Szombati, 2014 
84
 Ibid. 
 40 
The essential task of the ESRB is to supervise the financial system in order to detect potential 
risks that can affect the financial system and the real economy. When such a risk is detected, 
the ESRB – as it was mentioned above − can emit only warnings and recommendations to the 
Member States and other EU bodies. The ESRB, however, does not have the competence to 
make decisions that are binding on others, as the Member States and EU bodies are not 
obliged to act upon the warnings and recommendations issued by the ESRB. In its present 
configuration, the ESRB is a rather bloated body. In an EU with 28 (twenty-eight) Member 
States, the ESRB has members of which 38 (thirty-eight) have voting rights. Voting members 
comprise representatives of all Member States, the President and Vice-president of the ECB 
and other representatives of EU bodies. Most decisions in the ESRB are made by simple 
majority. A 2/3rds majority is needed only when a recommendation or warning is to be made 
public.
85
 Thus, the ESRB is unable to fulfil the role of an effective external control entity of 
the MNB, at least because of 2 (two) simple reasons. First, its recommendations are not 
binding. Second, since it has a bloated structure, it is likely not capable to respond in real 
emergencies in time, due to its overcomplicated voting mechanism.  
 
 
VII.4. FORESIGHT OF THE EFFECTS OF PROS AND CONS 
 
According to my assessment the effects of the decision on participation can be categorized 
through 2 (two) approaches. First, the pros and cons can be summarized from the aspect of the 
credit institutions, second from the aspect of the Member States. No matter which approach 
will be chosen, both of them have equal gravity. As regards credit institutions, it will be 
emphasized in the following, that the vast majority of Hungarian credit institutions are not 
interested in the government decision on participation, simply because they are not significant 
enough. To use oversimplification, the question of participation is about the right of 
supervision over the sole significant Hungarian-owned credit institution, the OTP Group. As 
regards the state level, the context is more complex, but a prudent summary is provided in 
chapter VII.4.2.  
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VII.4.1. CREDIT INSTITUTION APPROACH 
 
According to Article 4 (1) g) of the SSM Regulation, the ECB’s tasks shall include carrying 
out the supervision on a consolidating basis over credit institutions` parents established in one 
of the participating Member States. Although in principle it would mean that the ECB has all 
those supervisory powers that it possesses in relation to subsidiaries established in 
participating Member States, in reality the consolidated supervision is limited to the specific 
tasks enumerated in Article 112 (1) a) − c) of the CRD IV,86 mainly restricted to planning and 
coordination activities. Moreover, it does not affect the direct supervision by the national 
supervisory authority over subsidiaries established in a non-participating Member State. Since 
− as I mentioned above – these tasks conferred to the ECB by the SSM Regulation are mainly 
coordinative and design in nature, even though they are not exercised by the ECB without 
assistance, but together with the national competent authorities according to Article 9 (1) of 
the Draft SSM Framework Regulation. According to the cited article, When the ECB is the 
consolidating supervisor, it shall chair the college established pursuant to Article 116 of the 
CRD IV.
87
 The national competent authority where the parent, subsidiaries and significant 
branches within the meaning of Article 51 of the CRD IV,
88
 if any, are established, shall have 
the right to participate in the college as observers. If there is no college established pursuant to 
Article 116 of the CRD IV,
89
 and a significant supervised entity has branches in non-
participating Member States that are considered as significant in accordance with Article 
51(1) of the CRD IV,
90
 the ECB shall establish a college of supervisors with the competent 
authorities of the host Member States.
91
  Because the above mentioned mechanism, 
Wymeersch – at least in relation to subsidiaries out of the SSM92 − miscalculates himself, 
when he writes the following: ”With respect to subsidiaries of significant banking groups that 
qualify for the SSM regime, these will be directly supervised by the ECB, and hence included 
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in the overall supervision of the banking group, and this irrespective of their individual 
quantitative importance. The calculation takes place on a consolidated basis”.93 
 
By and large, the significant supervisory tasks and powers over the Hungarian subsidiaries of 
parent credit institutions established in the Euro-zone remains with the National Bank of 
Hungary as the national competent authority, in case of standing out of a close cooperation 
agreement.  
 
According to the above mentioned assessment, the debate on whether − as a non-euro zone 
Member State − Hungary should join the SSM through the possibility of a close cooperation 
or should not, is important from 2 (two) aspects.  
 
First, on the basis of the criteria regarding the 3 (three) most significant banks in each of the 
participating Member States
94
 in case of participation via close cooperation, the 3 (three) most 
significant banks would go under direct ECB supervision. For the time being, it cannot be 
ascertained with certainty which credit institutions would be described as the 3 (three) most 
significant ones on the basis of the “principle of the 3 (three) most significant banks”. 
However, those can only be Hungarian-owned credit institutions, since from a legal 
perspective the ECB supervises bank groups together on a consolidated basis.
95
 On the other 
hand, in the official communication between the ECB and National Bank of Hungary, the 
ECB referred to the fact that it might supervise the significant subsidiaries directly, which 
could mean an exchange in the order of the 3 (three) most significant.
96
 
 
Second, the question of participation is decisive regarding the form of supervision in relation 
to the foreign-owned credit institutions with parents established in the Euro-zone. According 
to the above mentioned information, in case of Hungary’s staying out from the SSM, the 
central supervision of the ECB shall be realized on a consolidated basis. However, the 
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consolidated supervision is limited to the specific tasks, mainly restricted to planning and 
coordination activities and it will not affect the direct supervision by the national supervisory 
authority over subsidiaries established in a non-participating Member State. In case of 
participation, the ECB could have more significant tasks and powers in relation with credit 
institution concerned.
97
   
 
VII.4.2. MEMBER STATE APPROACH 
 
In the EU accession-treaty, Hungary undertook that − after the fulfilment of the Maastricht 
criteria – it shall introduce the Euro as its official currency. This step will include 
automatically the accession to the banking union as well, as the basic purpose of the banking 
union is to strengthen the monetary and the fiscal union. Thus, in theory Hungary is able to 
apply for participation to the banking union at any time between the launch of the SSM 
(November 2014) and the domestic introduction of the Euro.
98
 By the time being, the 
Hungarian government has not made available any information on its opinion related to the 
likeliness participation to the SSM. However, the National Bank of Hungary shall emit a 
document in which it advises to the government not to join immediately the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, so the banking union. The MNB will advise to wait and see whether 
the newly introduced SSM will be able to meet the high expectations.
99
 Regarding the current 
close cooperation between the MNB and the newly re-elected government, it is highly 
unlikely that the government will refuse the opinion of the MNB and will decide to participate 
though. Even though, Hungary will likely keep the strategy of waiting-out, the alteration of 
some certain circumstances in the future will be able to change this opinion. The most 
significant of these circumstances are provided below.  
 
First, as regards the map on page 35, within the EU, but out of the Euro-zone, there are only 2 
(two) Member States − Denmark and Romania – who likely want to participate. For different 
reasons, but the UK and Sweden clearly proclaimed their will to stay out the SSM. The rest of 
the Member States are reluctant, and it can be assumed, most of them will not join the system 
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from the beginning. If the reluctant 5 (five) Member States (4 (four) out of Hungary) decide to 
join though, the market pressure, the need to avoid competitive disadvantage on the level of 
the Member States can prompt Hungary towards accession as well. Because of geo-political 
connexion, conduct of Poland is particularly important in relation to Hungary.
100
  
 
Second, if the participating Member States of the SSM and the ECB unilaterally take actions 
in each case, and this consensus marginalizes the opinion and lobby power of all other 
Member States outside the SSM, and makes it impossible to represent an opinion different 
from the ECB’s, in that case, a reconsideration of the national approach will be needed on 
participation. Such circumstances can profoundly alter the current decision of the MNB on 
participation.
101
  
 
Third, as it was mentioned above staying out can cause a competitive disadvantage not only 
for Member States, but for supervised credit institutions as well. If the financing conditions 
will drastically become different for credit institutions inside and outside the banking union, 
then the institutional pressure may force the Hungarian government to rethink its decision. 
The same is the case, if the domestic credit institutions experience serious competitive 
disadvantage in relation to other interbank transactions, meanwhile their costs regarding 
supervision are roughly the same, compared to their competitors established in a participating 
Member State. 
 
 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
By agreeing on a Single Supervisory Mechanism, the EU took one of its boldest decisions 
since the Euro was firstly introduced on 1
st
 of January 2002, since the SSM presents a 
satisfactory first step towards the Banking Union. Another positive element of the agreement 
is the large role that is offered to non-euro zone Member States in the SSM, within the scope 
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of what is legally feasible.
102
 In that sense, it is even more significant step than the 
introduction of the Euro, since with the SSM, the financial supervisory integration has the 
chance to cover immediately each Member State of the European Union, but the monetary 
union can have the same effect only at the end of a long road, which is – in its entirety – 
forgotten at the moment. 
 
Regarding the negative side of the framework, a bigger problem is the fact that the 
membership of non-euro zone countries remains rather noncommittal. At any given point, 
such countries will be able to leave the SSM.
103
 Continuing this thought, but approaching 
from a Member State aspect, the decision on whether Hungary wants to participate in the 
SSM or not, is basically a political resolution, less a legal one. I would not say that it is only a 
symbolic step from a legal perspective, but I do say the main significance of the immediate 
participation would rather have been a political gesture, than an irrevocable commitment 
towards the legal framework of the European-level financial supervision. Regarding the 
procedural structure of a close cooperation possibility, and the fact that even without 
participating as a close co-operator, Hungary needs to negotiate on a particular kind of 
cooperation with the ECB,
104
 the decision on accession becomes legally less significant. No 
matter Hungary’s accession decision, subsidiaries of Euro-zone parent credit institutions, 
operating in Hungary shall be supervised by the ECB somehow. In case of a close 
cooperation, it shall happen with the ultimate power of the ECB, based on the procedural rules 
of the SSM Framework Regulation. In case of non-participation, the ECB shall exert 
consolidated supervision over the subsidiaries of Euro-zone parent credit institutions, 
operating in Hungary, with a higher level of autonomy for the national competent authority. 
According to the above mentioned thoughts, there is 1 (one) significant issue remaining 
dependent on the participation decision. It is nothing other than the direct supervision of the 
one and only Hungarian-owned credit institution, which – according to its size and assets – 
shall be described as significant in the methodology of the ECB: the OTP Group.  
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In that regard, the significance of the decision on participation is much less in relation to 
Hungary, than in relation to other Member States, with more important financial sector, such 
as the UK. The above-mentioned statement seems to be true particularly with the anytime 
future possibility of participation available to Hungary.  
 
However, as regards the political sphere, Hungary’s likely staying out of the first round of 
accession to the SSM can be described as a next sign of its special way, and its non-
commitment towards the possibly deepening European integration.  
 
As regards the whole overview of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, according to my 
opinion the real substantive issue is whether the advantages of SSM such as unification can 
rise above the risks such as endless bureaucracy and difficulties in cooperation. If the 
operation of the SSM is able to confute the negative sounds envisioning slower decision-
making processes within the ECB than on national level, and establish an effective 
mechanism, it will be the only appropriate answer to those Member States who decided not to 
participate in the first round of accession. In case of a well-functioning, effective SSM, 
Member States such as Hungary will definitely reconsider their opinion. However, to do so, 
the SSM has to prove its viability. 
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